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Misinformation management is a growing area of
concern in Online Social Network (OSN) organizations.
There are several behavioral interventions employed
to address misinformation in OSN’s. One example
is offering users correction when they have engaged
with fake news. However, there is little research
quantifying the effectiveness of such interventions. We
conducted a laboratory experiment to test whether
experiencing corrective feedback improved peoples’
ability to discriminate true and false news claims during
extended extreme events like the COVID-19 pandemic.
Participants in the experiment were randomly assigned
to four different experiment conditions. Depending
on the condition assigned, participants received
varying amount of corrective feedback. Results from
this experiment suggests that increasing frequency of
corrective feedback may not affect peoples’ ability
to correctly assess information (or misinformation).
Political ideology and mistrust in fact-checking
organization were found to be the most significant
contributing factors. We discuss implications of the
findings from this experiment.
1. Introduction
Misinformation is rampant on Online Social
Networks (OSNs) spreading either organically
through behavioral contagion or on the basis of
strategic information operations [1, 2]. Simply put,
misinformation is inaccurate information that is
believed to be true by a lot of people and is spread
on OSNs by the users. Misinformation is not a new
phenomenon, but the affordances provided by modern
social networks have turbocharged it and have enabled
strategic operators to target vulnerable populations [3].
Based on whether a user spreads inaccurate information
intentionally or not, becomes the basis for labelling
a message as either disinformation (intentional)
or misinformation (unintentional) [4]. In this paper,
however, the term misinformation is used as an umbrella
term to represent all forms of false information.
Misinformation management is a growing area
of concern for social media organizations such as
Facebook and Twitter. In the event of extended
misinformation spread, as is the case during a pandemic
such as COVID-19, OSNs employ interventions
aimed at tracking and curbing misinformation spread.
However, the nature and impact of misinformation seen
during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has been wide
and varied as compared to misinformation during other
events such as natural calamities and elections.
Common interventions include using machine
learning algorithms to detect and remove
misinformation automatically. Early identification of a
false news perpetrator or identification of emergence
of the new theme of false news aids the organization in
managing its spread [5]. Machine learning algorithms
and network analysis approaches are usually applied
for fact identification, fact extraction, and fact-checking
processes. Crowdsourcing for fact-checking is used in
conjunction with automation to determine the veracity
of a claim made in an article. The partnership of
Facebook with Politifact1 is an example of one such
collaboration. Items (articles, social media posts) that
these filters automatically flag as rumor or fake are
presented to fact-checking experts for verification.
Based on their assessment, the item is eventually
labeled as fake news or not. The automated filter is then
revised based on this expert feedback.
Automation has its limitations, and by the time
a message is detected and removed, that message is
likely to have been seen and shared by many users
on the network [6]. Therefore, there is a growing
need to understand the fundamental cognitive challenges
people face while discerning truth from the cornucopia
of misinformation they experience on social media and
develop human-centered interventions. For example,
accuracy nudges have demonstrated effectiveness
in communicating the risk of misinformation [7].
1https://www.politifact.com/facebook-fact-checks/





Accuracy Nudges have been shown to encourage users
to think about the accuracy of the content as they are
reading it. Accuracy nudges was designed to solve
the problem of finding a balance between excessive
censoring of content and avoiding misinformation.
User education is another broad intervention
category that involves training and reinforcing users to
use caution when consuming news on social media. This
type of intervention focuses on increasing the awareness
among users of social networks and internet search
engines to develop the practice of verifying sources
when reading news on social media. SIFT is an example
of one such strategy proposed by Mike Caufield [8]. It
is an acronym for: Stop, Investigate the source, Find
better coverage and Trace claims quotes and media to
original context. Each of these steps are tied to some
simple skills that can be executed in 30 seconds or less.
Outside the OSN environment, public interest
organizations such as local and federal governments,
United Nations and associated organizations and other
private organizations with the interest of general public
also have their interventions to address misinformation.
They may issue warnings or fact checks to the
public when misinformation on certain topics become
exceedingly prevalent and begin to cause societal harm.
They may also pass laws punishing perpetrators of
misinformation or set standards for Online Social
Networks to comply with.
1.1. OSN User Education initiatives
To improve user education and actions, OSNs use
warning labels and pre-emptive warnings based on
the content of the post. This also includes offering
correction to users when they have been found to
engage with fake news [9]. Recently, Facebook has
started notifying users who have interacted (liked,
shared or commented) or have been unknowingly
exposed to COVID-19 related misinformation, and
redirecting them to factual content about COVID-19
maintained by authoritative sources such as WHO
(World Health Organization) [10]. This is a form of
corrective feedback provided to users’ past actions to
engage with misinformation. In fact, different forms
of such anti-misinformation feedback are used to warn
and correct user engagement with misinformation. For
example, OSNs regularly flag and block false messages
posted or shared by users, a form of outcome-based
feedback. Implementing these interventions that involve
the task of identifying misinformation messages that are
spreading fast and labeling them with the right warning
information relevant to the kind of misinformation
that is being spread, involves dedicated resources
on part of the OSN organization. Though the effect
of providing corrective feedback through warning
labels on misinformation detection outcomes has been
studied in the past [11], the amount of information
and its quality provided in the feedback and the
extent to which it makes a difference in the spread of
misinformation is unknown. It is necessary to quantify
how these interventions that aims to prevent the spread
of misinformation perform in extended extreme events
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
1.2. About COVID-19 misinformation
A unique aspect of extended extreme events such
as the COVID-19 pandemic is the multi-dimensional
nature of misinformation around the subject. The
misinformation around COVID-19 is not just restricted
to health-related misinformation. Due to the nature of
the pandemic, there has been a host of misinformation
surrounding this, enough for it to be termed as an
‘infodemic’[12]. Action by public authority, spread
through the community and general medical claims were
among the most common themes of misinformation
prevalent in social media.
For the purpose of this research study, the scope
was limited to medical misinformation surrounding
the COVID-19 pandemic as it has direct health
consequences. Surprisingly, even within just this aspect
of misinformation, there were several dimensions of
misinformation such as misinformation surrounding
cures, prevention and the mechanism of spread of the
SARS-CoV2 virus.
In this paper, we study the effect of increasing
the corrective feedback, similar to that adopted by
Facebook [13]. Through this study we would like to
understand if increasing corrective feedback to users,
will result in better misinformation detection.
2. Background
This section covers the literary background of
current research in correction of misinformation and
introduces the thesis that will be studied in the paper.
2.1. Misinformation Correction
Several meta-analysis studies have been conducted
aggregating results from multiple papers that conducted
behavioral experiments on correction of misinformation.
They give us a general direction on aspects of correction
that have worked effectively to curb the spread of
misinformation in the past [14, 15, 16]. Actively
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correcting users after the act using corrective rebuttals
in different formats or dissuading them before they
engage in misinformation with warnings have typically
been the focus of corrective studies in misinformation.
The study by Walter and Murphy (2018), suggests
that de-biasing technique, platform design and delay
of corrections have a statistically significant effect on
the spread of misinformation, suggesting that better
platform designs coupled with the right fact-checked
correction in a timely manner has the capability to
slow the spread of misinformation. This particular
meta-analysis looked at misinformation from across
domains, so the findings are not restricted to any one
kind of misinformation. Where timeliness of correction
is concerned, the meta-analyses suggest that while
delays that are small (with time enough to complete
a filler task before given a correction), the difference
in impact is not that great but if the corrections are
delayed by more than a day, the results are significantly
different. This suggests that timeliness of correction is
important though immediacy may not be that important.
Warnings have been suggested as an intervention in
several studies (at least 3 studies before 2018 as per the
meta-analysis by Walter and Murphy 2018). They have
been shown to be effective when compared to claims
on social media without warnings. In fact, one study
[17], conducted a simulation using their experiment
results, suggested that claims without warnings spread
to 5 times more people than claims with warnings.
The meta-analyses studies suggest that more systematic
rebuttals to claims are more effective than mere
warnings that appear before claims. A detailed
debunking of a claim enables the user to abandon their
beliefs on the rumor by providing an alternate coherent
model of belief[14]. In fact, detailed fact-checking and
coherence related de-biasing methods worked better in
several studies than just pointing out the credibility of
the source. The observed difference in impact in these
methods were statistically significant[15].
Thus, existing studies suggest the use of timely
correction of misinformation using a correctly worded
rebuttal, would be effective in slowing the spread of
misinformation and in general educating the public
about the pandemic. Considering the insights on
timeliness, it would suggest an immediate algorithmic
correction from OSNs on misinformation from a
crowdsourced fact-check would be effective.
2.2. Frequency of corrections
Though the effect of providing corrective feedback
on misinformation detection outcomes has been studied
in the past [11], the amount of information and its
quality provided in the feedback is unknown. As the
authors in Byrd and John (2021) noted, combining
feedback training with a critical thinking intervention
is necessary for the users to learn the right behavior.
Getting the users to ”learn” the right behavior is
an important aspect of misinformation management.
According to the instance-based learning theory (IBLT)
[18], frequent experience of events will reinforce the key
ideas in memory and enable people to make the correct
judgments. In this paper, we investigate whether the
frequency of experiencing misinformation corrections
and information reinforcements influences the more
complex detection decisions in social media news feeds.
If lessons from detection problems in Cybersecurity
were to be learned, it can be expected that when the
frequency of corrective feedback increases, there will
be an increase in people’s attention that would result
in higher sensitivity to misinformation [19]. A test of
this hypothesis would provide the theoretical grounds of
the frequency with which OSN users could be provided
with algorithmic corrections or feedback in the OSN
platform to address the problem misinformation from
the perspective of user behavior.
Figure 1. Example trial in the experiment presenting
a news claim.
3. Experiment Design
Using an experimental design consisting of three
phases, we measured whether experiencing frequent
corrective feedback will enable people to learn to
become wary of engaging with misinformation. The
experiment had 3 phases: a pre-phase, an intervention
phase and a post-phase. The pre-phase and post-phase
had 15 trials each. The intervention phase had 24
trials. The number of trials per phase were determined
through several pilot tests. The aim was to limit the
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experiment duration to a reasonable limit, about 30
minutes. During each trial, a news claim designed to
look like a tweet was presented to the human participant
(see Figure 1). Below each claim, the participants
were asked to provide their assessment of the claim,
whether what was mentioned in the claim was true or
false, how confident they were with their assessment
and the action they would take after reading the claim
(like, share, mute etc.). During the intervention phase of
the experiment, some of participants received corrective
feedback to some of their decisions. Depending on
the experiment condition assigned, participants either
received no feedback or increasing levels of corrective
feedback. The corrective feedback was presented
as a correction from the fact-checking organization
Politifact. Participants did not receive any corrections
during the pre- and post-phases of the experiment. Such
an experiment design was used to study the following
aspects about misinformation correction.
3.1. Discerning information
Does offering more corrective feedback result in
improved discerning of information? The experiment
consisted of four conditions. In the control condition,
the participant does not receive any corrective feedback.
However, participants in the other three conditions
received progressively higher amounts of corrective
feedback (25%, 50% and 75%) during the intervention
phase. They received corrective feedback on both
information and misinformation claims. Participants’
decisions during the pre- and post phase were compared
to measure the impact of frequency of corrective
feedback. The hypothesis was that increasing the
frequency of corrective feedback will improve the
performance of the participant in being able to
discern and differentiate between misinformation and
information in claims. For example, to counter
misinformation spread regarding effectiveness of masks,
does it help if organizations such as Facebook provided
frequent corrective feedback to the users who engage
with misinformation regarding the use of masks to
prevent COVID.
3.2. Assessments and actions
Do assessments correctly translate into actions?
Earlier studies of motivation in users sharing
misinformation found that a considerable portion of
users shared misinformation for reasons other than their
opinion of its truthfulness [20]. Some of the reasons for
sharing misinformation were to obtain others’ opinions
on that information, to express own opinions, and to
interact with others. These results suggest that there
may be some mismatch between what the user thinks
of the correctness of the news claim versus how the
user chooses to amplify the claim. For this reason the
user’s assessment of the claim and the action chosen for
the claim was analyzed to study gap between belief and
behavior, for example, when a user retweets unproven
prevention methods for COVID, do they really believe
in those methods?
3.3. Correction performance by topic
Did the users perform better in some dimensions of
COVID-19 misinformation/information?
The experiment is designed such that the participants
were provided corrective feedback on randomly
chosen information and misinformation claims (without
controlling for the dimension of COVID medical
misinformation for which they received feedback). The
experiment design was used to measure if participants’
assessments of claims for certain dimensions were better
than others. For example, were participants better at
identifying fake cures than they were at identifying
claims on COVID-19 disease spread.
3.4. Behavior learning
Does offering more corrective feedback result in
users learning the right behavior?
Offering a well-worded rebuttal for misinformation
is cited as one of the most effective methods for
combating misinformation in the meta-analyses. Thus,
the rebuttals were worded in the form of a Politifact
Fact-check with their trademark Truth-o-meter2. In the
cases of misinformation, the feedback was also carefully
worded in the form of a ”truth sandwich” [21] by
starting with the truth, indicating the lie in the claim and
returning and reiterating the truth. In this way, it was
passively suggested to the users who received corrective
feedback that a fact-checking service such as Politifact
may be used to verify the information on a given claim.
The participants’ responses to the claims in pre-phase
and post-phase were compared to measure if there were
any learning effects from the intervention phase. For
example, when offered more corrective feedback do
users imbibe the behavior of researching the facts of a
claim when in doubt.
4. Methods
The experiment interface was developed using
JsPsych, which is a javascript library for developing
behavioral experiments in a web browser [22]. Amazon
2https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/media/
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MTurk was used to recruit participants for the
experiment. The main constraints for being a participant
in the study was being over 18 years old, geographical
location (constrained to the United States) and the
requirement that they should have a Twitter account
(so that they would be familiar with a typical social
media environment). In addition to this, it was also
required that the participants not be associated with the
University of Washington. All experiment protocols
were approved by the university institutional review
board (IRB).
4.1. Participant Characteristics
200 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental conditions (No feedback, 25%, 50%
and 75%). Care was taken to ensure we received
responses from equal number of participants (50) in
each condition. 17 out of the 200 participants failed
attention checks and their data was excluded from the
study. Of the remaining 183 participants, 84 (42.2%)
were female and 115 (57.7%) were male. 43 (21.6%)
were between the ages 18-29 and 156 (78.4%) were
between the ages 30-49. Their political ideologies were
collected on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 being most liberal and
7 being most conservative). About 117 (58.7%) had left
wing ideologies, 57 (28.6%) had right wing ideologies
and the rest were neutral.
4.2. Claims Used
News claims that were displayed to the participants
were collected from real instances of information
and misinformation. True claims from various news
categories were collected: Politics, Business, Sports,
Science and Technology and COVID-19. The goal
was to present the participant with news claims from
different categories to simulate a real-world news feed
in social media. However, all the misinformation claims
in all three phases of the experimented were specific
to COVID-19 topics, for e.g., misinformation claims
regarding Covid-19 spread and cures. An experiment
design with only Covid-19 related claims (true and
misinformation) would bias participants into producing
more false alerts - classifying majority of claims as
misinformation. Furthermore, such a design is critical
for measuring how participants discriminated true news
from misinformation using signal detection theory [23]
- to measure how well participants discriminated signals
(Covid-19 misinformation claims) from noise (true
claims sampled from different news categories including
Covid-19 related news).
For COVID-19 related misinformation and
information tweets, the International Fact Checking
Network’s (IFCN) aggregator website for COVID-19
fact-checks was used3. For other news categories, the
Associated Press’s (AP)4 twitter handle for every news
category (for example, @ap politics for politics news)
was mined to gather salient information in that category.
Misinformation for these categories were identified by
searching Snopes.com and Politifact. Real instances
of tweets amplifying a particular information were
collected using the Hoaxy service [24, 25]. With this,
a database of about 100 news claims was built. This
was reduced to 54 claims and 4 additional claims were
included as attention checks. Therefore, a total of 58
claims were used in the experiment to keep experiment
duration within reasonable limits. The Python Imaging
Library was used to design these claims to look like
real tweets from social media. The authors of these
news claims were made to appear as a mixture of
verified and unverified personalities on social media.
In all three phases, one-third of all the messages were
misinformation.
4.3. Procedure
When the participants click on the survey link
in MTurk, they were redirected to consent page
where they entered their MTurk id, age and declared
non-association with University of Washington. Then
they were redirected to the instructions page of the
experiments which gave them details about the three
phases and the tasks expected from them. Participants in
the control experience one long phase with no corrective
feedback. Participants in all other conditions completed
the experiment in phases. They first made judgments
on the claims presented in pre-phase and then, were
moved to intervention phase, where depending on
their randomly assigned experimental condition, they
received action-based feedback on a certain percentage
of randomly selected news claims. Example of a
corrective feedback is given in Figure 2. In the figure
the participant choose to amplify a misinformation
claim and is presented with a correction message from
Politifact. The feedback text was worded as a ”truth
sandwich”. After the intervention phase, the participants
were moved to the third and final post-phase. For
every claim shown to the participant, in addition to their
responses on the claim (their assessments, confidence
level and actions), we also measured their response
time, recorded whether feedback was provided to a
particular claim in the intervention phase and whether




actions would be to choose options that do not spread
misinformation and to choose options that do not curb
information). At the end of post-phase, the participants
were presented with a final survey that collected their
demographic data which included questions on age,
gender, education, political ideology, concern about
COVID, how often they check COVID related news, the
different social media websites they are familiar with
and how much they trust Politifact. All participants were
paid $4 as a fixed base payment and received a $1 bonus
payment for passing all attention checks.
Figure 2. An example of negative feedback given to
the participant
5. Results
The design of this experiment can be best described
as a mixed-effects model. Mixed models are a good
fit here because we collected multiple measurements
from each participant and mixed models are well suited
for such within-subject designs. In this study, we are
interested in the effect frequency of feedback which
we tested as 4 different experimental conditions (0%,
25%, 50% and 75% feedback conditions) with about 50
users in each condition. Hence, for our study feedback
frequency is modelled as a Fixed effect. Random
effects in our study are demographic variables and other
variables that capture individual differences.
5.1. Effect of corrective feedback
In this experiment, we are interested in how well a
participant discerns information (and misinformation).
For every news claim shown, we gathered data on
whether the user has assessed a piece of information
correctly and whether they then take the right action
towards curbing the spread of misinformation and
amplifying the right information. The two outcomes
were named ’correct assessment’ and ’correct action’.
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the ’correct action’
outcome by experiment condition and phase. Figure 4
shows a histogram of the ’correct assessment’ outcome
by experiment condition and phase. We found a
significant correlation between participants’ actions and
their assessment of the information (over 88%) which
suggested that the remaining analysis could focus on one
of these two measures.
Figure 3. A histogram of fraction of correct actions
by experiment phase and condition
Figure 4. An histogram of correct assessments by
experiment phase and condition
From an initial examination of the outcomes, it
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seems that corrective feedback has a mixed effect. For
further analysis, a mixed model of the participants’
percentage of correct assessments from the experiment
was computed with feedback condition as the primary
fixed effect and news category and their interaction
with feedback condition as secondary fixed effects and
subject-wise variability as a random effect. The results
from this analysis are tabulated in Table 1.
Table 1. Results from Mixed Model Analysis
Effects Estimate t-value p-value
Intercept 0.63 23.43 0.001
Feedback % ≤ 0.001 1.37 0.17
Celeb news -0.34 -8.48 0.001
COVID Cures 0.14 4.32 0.001
COVID Prevention 0.15 5.23 0.001
COVID Spread -0.057 -1.91 0.06
Politics news -0.118 -3.57 0.001
Science and tech 0.167 4.14 0.001
From the table, it can be seen that the feedback
condition is not a statistically significant factor
in determining the correct assessment percentage.
However, the different categories of news affect the
outcomes. Particularly, participants were more likely
to make errors in discerning celebrity news, news
claims containing information / misinformation about
the mechanism of spread of COVID (though this effect
was not statistically significant). Participants were less
likely to make errors when discerning news claims
containing science or technology news and news about
the prevention of COVID.
With the model results suggesting that increasing
corrective feedback does not help the user discern
information/misinformation better, an important
consideration is whether time elapsed was an important
factor in the performance of the user. It is possible
that exhaustion associated with reading and evaluating
multiple news claims may have lead to a decreased
performance in the post-phase.
5.2. Learning effects
For the primary outcome of correct assessment, we
calculated the signal detection outcomes d-prime (a
measure of sensitivity) and response bias (bias toward
classifying a claim as misinformation or information)
to study how the experiment affected the participants’
discerning abilities. The average d-prime by phase
and experiment condition is provided in Table 2. The
average response bias by phase and experiment is
provided in Table 3.
With d-prime for assessments, apart from the
Table 2. Average d-prime
Condition Pre-phase Post-phase




Table 3. Average response bias
Condition Pre-phase Post-phase




anomaly for the 25% feedback condition, in all other
cases the d-prime decreases in the post-phase condition
as compared to the pre-phase condition. This implies
that the difference between the hit rate and the false
alarm rate reduces and that the user discerns information
better in the pre-phase than the post-phase. Similarly,
with response bias or beta, we find that for both
actions and assessments, the bias to say ‘yes’ or
classify a news as misinformation increases between
pre and post phases irrespective of the type of feedback
condition. A t-test conducted pre-phase and post-phase
signal detection measures for the different experiment
conditions yielded a statistically significant difference
only for the 75% feedback condition. From the trend, we
can draw the implication that as the participant receives
more corrective feedback on their actions, they become
more conservative in their assessments, erring on the
side of caution.
5.3. Demographic effects
The demographic effects were studied by using
a generalized linear model of demographic factors
collected from participants to predict the signal
detection outcomes in the post-phase. The factors
considered in the analysis were experiment condition,
age, gender, political ideology (scale of 1 to 7, 1 being
very liberal and 7 being very conservative) and mistrust
in the credibility of Politifact (0 - Very trustworthy to 4
- Not trustworthy at all). Table 4 shows the estimates of
the model and their statistical significance.
From Table 4, it can be seen that the most
significant demographic factors were Political ideology
and Mistrust in the fact-checking organization employed
in the study. Participants who subscribed to right-wing
political ideology were likely to have a lower sensitivity
to discerning information (or misinformation). Also
participants who reported higher mistrust in Politifact
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Table 4. Generalized Linear Model predicting
post-phase d-prime values by demographic
factors
Effects Estimate t-value p-val
Intercept 1.582 7.66 0.001
Feedback % ≤ 0.001 -0.22 0.82
Gender: Male 0.21 1.99 0.05
Age -0.07 -0.52 0.60
Political ideology (P) -0.095 -2.07 0.04
MistrustinPolitifact (MP) -0.21 -1.89 0.05
Interaction (P * MP) -0.02 -0.69 0.49
and their credibility were likely to demonstrate lower
sensitivity. It can also be noted that Political ideologies
and mistrust in Politifact did not have any interaction
effects. This implies that mistrust in the fact-checking
organization was prevalent across the spectrum of
Political ideologies.
6. Discussion
6.1. Feedback and nuance
Results from the experiment suggest that frequent
corrective feedback may not have a significant effect
on users’ behavior. The expectation was that increased
frequency of corrective feedback will emphasize the
importance of fact-checking when in doubt and will
become a behavior adopted by the participants. But
most participants in the experiment made judgments on
the claims presented to them in a vacuum. This is
evidenced by how the users responded to the question
”How often did you look up on the internet for the
validity of the claims shown in the experiment?”. 172
participants out of 183 (94%) reported not checking the
facts. This issue, particularly with MTurk participants,
has been discussed previously [26].
Eliciting response from the participant for every
news claim is a key difference between the experimental
environment and the social media environment. In a
typical OSN environment, users can sift through plenty
of information without interacting with anything. But
in the experimental environment, they were required to
give their assessment on every single claim that they
read. This may have caused time constraints which
might have prevented the participants from looking up
the veracity of claims.
One possible explanation for the lack of difference
is information avoidance [27]. Expectation is that
people when presented with useful information would
take that information into consideration while making
future judgments. However, decades of research
has shown that people dislike receiving information
that conflicts with their existing beliefs and mental
models [28]. This could lead to continued influence
effect of misinformation on individual’s decisions [29].
The other possible explanation is that people may
have difficulty transferring correction received on one
misinformation claim to correcting another, albeit
thematically related, misinformation. It is also
important to note that participants in the experiment
did better on specific news categories as compared to
others. Particularly, claims on COVID prevention and
cures and Science and technology news were categories
on which participants did well. Politics and Celebrity
news were topics where participants did not do well.
These differences arise due to the nature of news in
these categories and has been noted in previous studies
as well [15]. Future research must analyze the impact of
frequent correction on specific claims.
6.2. Learning
Results from the experiment reveal that exposing
users to more corrective feedback may decrease their
sensitivity and they may become more biased towards
classifying a claim as misinformation. This is typically
how detection task outcomes are affected [30, 31].
The approach of increasing feedback works for most
detection problems (such as baggage screening and
malicious email detection), where a slight increase
in false alarms does not adversely affect outcomes.
However in information dissemination, identification
of misinformation is as important as not discrediting
facts. In reviewing survey data, it was seen that most
participants (94%), regardless of frequency of corrective
feedback, did not look up the facts when presented
with a claim. This implies that simply exposing
users to more frequent misinformation feedback, even
if it is a correctly worded rebuttal, is creating
experiences without adding contextual meaning to those
experiences. The feedback given must be followed
up with more understanding of how the process of
information discerning works, so that users imbibe the
right behaviour when consuming news on social media.
6.3. Limitations and Future work
One of the limitations of the study in terms of the
participant demographics was the limited age range and
political ideologies of the participants. 78.4% of the
participants were between the ages 30 and 49, and only
28.6% of the participants had a right-wing political
ideology. The lower percentage of participants with
right wing political ideology may also explain the lack
of interaction between political ideology and mistrust in
Politifact despite their statistically significant effects on
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the main outcome. Future work in this area has to focus
on methods to include participants across different age
ranges and political ideologies.
Despite having restricted the theme of information to
COVID-19 disease related claims, the authors found that
claims within this domain itself was wide and varied.
There were claims pertaining to mechanism of spread
of the disease, claims pertaining to disease prevention
and those discussing cures and treatments. Due to the
variation in performance of participants in each type of
claim, it was not possible to gain insights on the effect
of feedback frequency on any one type of claim. Future
studies can focus on one aspect of COVID-19 medical
misinformation. Alternatively, other dimensions of
COVID-19 misinformation like Xenophobic or Racial
prejudices can be explored [32].
Another limitation as discussed previously was the
requirement to collect data from participants after every
claim which might have exhausted the participants.
In future work, the experimental environment can
incorporate some OSN environment features such as
browsing without having to make assessments and
choose actions for every claim, so that the experimental
environment closely mirrors the real life experience.
The insight from demographic factors, particularly that
of mistrust in the fact-checking organization denotes
the larger problem of information avoidance when the
information presented in not in line with the beliefs of
the participant. This has been observed in previous
work, where in users do not change their beliefs even
when repeatedly presented with facts [33]. In the
future, these differences can be addressed by gathering
their ideologies beforehand and having influencers
or organizations that embrace their political beliefs
reiterate facts especially where medical misinformation
is concerned.
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